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WESTERN THRACIAN MUSLIMS 
IN ATHENS: FROM ECONOMIC 
MIGRATION TO RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATION 
DimitrisAntoniou* 
INTRODUCTION : TROUBLES WITH WORDS1 
Scholars often start their analyses of the minority population of Western 
Thrace with demographics. For these authors, it seems of crucial importance 
that the reader knows that this population is divided into three distinct groups 
which in turn can be counted in absolute numbers. In one of his latest works 
on the topic, Baskin Oran provides us with the following information : « this 
profoundly religious minority of 100 000 - is composed of approximately 
70 000 Muslims of Turkish ethnic origin, 35 000 Pomaks (slavophone 
Muslims) and 5 000 Muslims of Romany ethnic origin »2. However, another 
scholar provides slightly different estimations and uses slightly different 
terms. According to Yorgos Christides, in 1993, the Greek state estimated the 
number of "Muslims" living in Western Thrace to 114 000, and clarified that 50 % 
of them were of "Turkish origin", 35 % were “Pomaks” and 15 % were 
“Athingani”3. But, even it seems easy to understand who the people of "Turkish 
' Oxford-Princeton Research Project: Culture and Religions of the Eastern Mediterranean World. 
Contact: dimitris.antoniou@orinst.ox.ac.uk 
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 The list of friends and colleagues who read this article is so long as to embarrass me. Nevertheless I 
should mention with gratitude the advice and guidance of Celia Kerslake, Yahya Michot, Richard Clogg, 
Olga Demetriou, Renée Hirschon, Aspasia Papadopoulou, Kerem Oktem and Reem Abou El-Fadl, all from 
Oxford University. Likewise I most gratefully acknowledge the critical interest of my mentors and col-
leagues from Harvard University's Center for Hellenic Studies Gregory Nagy, Jennifer Reilly, Anna 
Stavrakopoulou as well as the assistance and support I received from Haldun Gulalp, Xavier Bougarel 
Tassos Costopoulos and Dimitris Trimis. 
2
 Oran (Baskin), « The Story of Those Who Stayed. Lessons From Articles 1 and 2 of the 1923 Convention » 
in Hirschon (Renee), Crossing the Aegean : An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange bet-
ween Greece and Turkey, Oxford : Berghahn, 2003, p. 98. 
3
 Christides (Yorgos), « The Muslim Minority in Greece », in Niblock (Tim), Nonneman (Gerd), Szajkowski 
(Bogdan), eds., Muslim Communities in the New Europe, Berkshire : Ithaca Press, 1996, p. 135. 
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origin" are, who are the “Pomaks”, the Roma and the “Athingani” ? 
These sorts of questions inevitably require an examination of a set of de-
finitions. Such an examination is essential, since, having undertaken to work 
with such terms, one is obliged to follow a specific line of thought, dictated by 
their very usage. Definitions of "ethnic groups" can be quite useful, however, 
as long as one accepts that they usually involve oversimplified projections of 
rather perplexing realities. Alexis Alexandris describes the “Pomaks” as « a lar-
gely slavophone Balkan Muslim group » which « lives in small settlements in 
the mountainous Rhodope regions of Thrace near the Bulgarian border, with 
the biggest concentration situated in Xanthi province where they form 63,4 % 
of the Muslim population »4. On the other hand, the terms “Roma”, “Athingani” 
and "Gypsies" describe the same group of people. “Athingani” is the formal 
Greek term used to describe "Gypsies" and was gradually replaced by the term 
"Roma" in the 1990s. But what do “Pomaks” and “Gypsies” believe about them-
selves ? What is the identity they manifest ? 
From the outset of this research, I became well aware that it is not an easy 
task to divide Western Thracian migrants into distinct “ethnic categories”. 
More specifically, my experience in central Athens (Gazi) with those labelled 
"Muslim Roma" by the Greek state showed that the vast majority identified 
themselves as "Turks". However, on several occasions, I was told by “Pomak” 
and “Turkish” informants in Thrace and Athens that the residents of Gazi are 
“Gypsies” and not “Turks”. This was also the case with some “Pomaks” in 
Athens, who claimed to be “Turks” but were still described as “Pomaks”, not 
only by Greeks but also by their fellow “Pomaks” in Western Thrace5. Thus, the 
following questions arise : how should one describe a person who claims to be 
a “Turk” when others describe him as “Gypsy”? And why do so many “Pomaks” 
and “Gypsies” claim to be “Turks” ? 
I would argue that the answer to the first question is quite simple. The 
terms “ethnic Turk”, “Pomak”, “Gypsy” and “Roma”, usually found in the litera-
ture, are largely products of an academic obsession with dividing people into 
categories and stamping one ethnic identity on them in order to make sense 
of their existence. But for Western Thracian migrants in Athens, ethnic iden-
tity can be quite situational. It varies according to geography, time, the lan-
guage of communication, and even the researcher. If that is the case, however, 
what are the appropriate terms to be used in describing the different segments 
of the minority population of Western Thrace ? If it is true that “Pomaks”, “eth¬ 
4
 Alexandris (Alexis),« Religion or Ethnicity: The Identity Issue of the Minorities in Greece and Turkey », 
in Hirschon (Renée), ed., op.cit, p. 125. 
5
 Olga Demetriou was amongst the first scholars to deal with the problem of using or not using “Pomak -
ness” as a classification category. See Demetriou (Olga), « Prioritizing "Ethnicities" : The Uncertainty of 
Pomak-ness in the Urban Greek Rhodoppe », Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27 (1), 2004. 
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nic Turks”, “Muslim Gypsies” constitute politically loaded labels, it is also true 
that any possible alternatives to the afore terms could be equally problematic. 
There is no easy way of avoiding these labels since Pomaks speak of Pomaks, 
Pomaks of Turks, Gypsies of Pomaks, Turks of Gypsies, and so on. Instead of 
trying to propose ways of avoiding these labels, I believe that it is more useful 
to admit from the outset that they exist and have long been in use as political 
and cultural categories rather than as "objective" realities. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing sections of this article, I will not refrain from using mainstream ethnic 
categorizations. But I will also try to indicate the context and the identifiers as 
clearly as possible. 
GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 
The answer to the second question is less straightforward. One must first 
examine Greek and Turkish policies during the second half of the 20 th century 
towards the minority population in Western Thrace. This helps us to unders-
tand why the “minority” consciousness currently manifested by many 
Western Thracian Muslims is one «that since the 1970s has increasingly found 
its definition in notions of a transnational Turkish identity whose rights are 
best promoted and guaranteed by the Turkish nation state »6.I would argue 
that this is mainly a result of the inconsistencies characterizing Greek policy 
towards this minority population. More specifically I will refer to specific state 
policies and “scientific” campaigns of the second half of the 20 th century 
which aimed at constructing abstract and simplistic categories, creating divi-
sions and taxonomies among people. 
From the early 1950s until 1967, the Greek state actively supported the lin-
guistic Turkification of the local Muslim population, through compulsory mi-
nority education?. The political rationale behind this policy was that it would 
6
 Kaiakasidou (Anastasia), « Vestiges of the Ottoman Past : Muslims under Siege in Contemporary 
Thrace », paper presented at the 92nd Annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, 
Washington D.C., 17-21 November 1993, p. 5. 
7
 In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Muslim children in Western Thrace 
attend minority primary schools and learn Turkish as their first language. As a result, many of them are 
not able to communicate in the Greek language, nor to attain a secondary education, as this usually re-
quires attendance at mainstream Greek schools and fluency in the Greek language. Even fewer are able 
to pursue a university education, either in Greece or in Turkey. It is also usefull to note that the treaty's 
provisions are confined to the area of Western Thrace. Thus, the indigenous Muslim communities of the 
Dodecanese and the Western Thracians living in Athens do not have access to minority education. See 
Tsitselikis (Konstantinos), To diethnes ke europaiko kathestos prostasias ton glossikon dikaiomaton ton 
meionotiton ke i Elliniki ennomi taxi (The International and European Status of Linguistic Minority 
Rights and the Greek Legal Order), Athens : A.N. Sakkoulas, 1996, p. 346 ; U. S. Department of State, 
Human Rights Report for 1999 - Greece, p. 18, available at http://www.bannet.org/6-3_15gr.htm. 
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be better for certain segments of the minority population to identify themsel-
ves with the Turks of Western Thrace and Turkey, rather than with the 
Bulgarian communists8. Despite the rising tension between the Greek and 
Turkish communities in Cyprus, as well as the outbreak of violence against the 
Greeks of Istanbul in 1955, the enemy was Bulgaria and not the nominal NATO 
ally, Turkey. Subsequently, the border between Greece and Bulgaria became 
the front line of the NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation, and was heavily forti-
fied for many kilometres on both sides9. Foreigners were denied access to the 
region, while freedom of movement of the indigenous population was ham-
pered and the region was declared a Military Surveillance Zone, the so-called 
epitiroumeni zoni10. Nevertheless, the rising tension between Greece and 
Turkey over enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) resulted in a change in 
the Greek policy towards this minority population by the then military dicta-
torship (1967-1974). 
From that time onwards many Greek officials and academics clearly defi-
ned the minority population as comprised of three categories of people : the 
“ethnic Turks”, the “Pomaks” and the “Gypsies”11. The main objective of subse-
quent Greek governments was to cut all ties between the “Pomaks” on the one 
hand, and Turks and Turkey on the other. This was the most profound change 
in Greece's official perception of the “Pomaks”, as they were now considered 
Greeks, as well as the beginning of a state-sponsored campaign aiming at pro-
ving that the “Pomaks” were islamized Christians of Greek descent12. Thus, 
« the Pomak traditions of cutting the round bread into four pieces and of put-
ting cross-shaped iron bars to windows were interpreted as reminiscent of the 
Pomaks' Christian times »13. Even racial arguments were put forward. For in-
stance, blood categories were cited in order to prove that the distribution of 
8
 Biunnbauei (Ulf), « The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece : Between the "Self" and the 
“Other”» Journal of the Institute for Muslim Minority Affairs, 21 (1), April 2001. 
9
 Poulton (Hugh), « Changing Notions of National Identity among Muslims in Thrace and Macedonia : 
Turks, Pomaks and Roma » in Poulton (Hugh), Taji-Farouki (Suha), eds., Muslim Identity and the Balkan 
State, London : Hurst, 1997. 
10
 Labrianidis (Lois), « The Impact of the Greek Military Surveillance Zone on the Greek Side of the 
Bulgarian-Greek Borderlands », Boundary and Security Bulletin, 7 (2), 1999 ; Labrianidis (Lois),« “Internal 
Frontiers” as a Hindrance to Development », European Planning Studies, 9 (1), 2001. 
11
 Alexandra (Alexis), The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, Athens : 
Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992 ; Hidiroglou (Pavlos) The Greek Pomaks and their Relations with 
Turkey, Athens : Proskinio Editions, 1990. 
12
 Demetiiou (Olga), art.cit, pp. 106-107. 
13
 Oian (Baskin), «Balkan Muslims : A comparative Study on Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo », 
CEMOTI, (18), 1994. 
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blood groups among Pomaks was much more similar to that of Greeks than to 
that of Turks14. 
Paradoxically, retaliatory and discriminatory measures against all members 
of the minority population of Western Thrace were introduced on a tit-for-tat 
basis with Turkey15 On many occasions, members of this minority population 
were prevented from obtaining driving licences for tractors and from acquiring 
the equipment necessary to operate agricultural business. Many of them also 
lost their land properties as a result of government expropriations. Moreover, 
members of the minority population of Western Thrace were not allowed to elect 
their muftis (Muslim jurists) nor to identify themselves as "Turks"16. 
These practices continued even after the restoration of democracy in 1974, 
due to widely spread and deeply embedded fears that « Turkey harbours ex-
pansionist designs against Greece »17. More specifically, Greek policies towards 
the minority population of Western Thrace aimed at removing the possibility 
that Greek Thrace would become a "second Cyprus"18. In this context it is inter-
esting to note that the state ban on the word "Turkish" and its derivatives to 
refer to anything related to the minority population of Western Thrace took 
place right after the "declaration of independence" of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in 1983. But the more successive Greek governments tried to 
prevent the emergence of a single Turkish minority consciousness, the more 
“Pomaks” and “Gypsies” would transform into “Turks”. In other words, a study 
of Greek minority policies in the 1980s could easily demonstrate how policies 
of discrimination provided a base for the unification of highly diverse local 
communities19. 
It was only during the last few years that the Greek government radically 
changed its policy towards the minority population of Western Thrace, tacitly 
confessing the failures of the past. On 12 March 1990, the then Prime Minister 
Constantine Mitsotakis (New Democracy- ND), the leader of the opposition 
Andreas Papandreou (Pan-Hellenic Socialistic Movement - PASOK) and 
Kharilaos Florakis (Communist Party of Greece - KKE) agreed that « Greece's 
policy [in Thrace] must be based on the economic and cultural development 
of the area. We have done nothing to develop the region. There must be strict 
14
 Xirotiris, (Nikolaos), Idiai paratiriseis epi tis katanomis ton syhnotiton ton omadon aimatos eis tous 
Pomakous (Personal Observations on the Proportional Frequency of Blood Groups among the Pomaks), 
PhD Dissertation, Salonika : Aristotle University of Salonika, 1971. 
15
 Brunnbauer (Ulf), art.cit., p. 48. 
16
 Clogg (Richard), A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 206. 
17
 Alexandris (Alexis), art.cit., p. 128. 
18
 Demetriou (Olga), art.cit., p. 107. 
19
 See also Aarbakke (Vemund), The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
Bergen : University of Bergen, 2001, pp. 299-338. 
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observance of the principle of equal treatment »20. The new strategy included 
measures such as greater economic development on the one hand and the 
settlement of Pontic Greeks arriving from the Soviet Union on the other. 
In the 1990s, restrictions of movement were gradually lifted in the moun-
tainous areas of Rhodope. According to Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, 
Costas Simitis' election as the new leader of the governing PASOK party in 1996 
resulted in a change of Greece's strategic priorities21. Simitis placed at the top 
of his agenda Greece's convergence with EU economic prerequisites, and toge-
ther with the “modernizers' faction” of PASOK questioned the intensifying 
arms race between Greece and Turkey. A few years later, the then Greek 
Foreign Minister George Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem 
started working towards the preparation of an official rapprochement, which 
was greatly facilitated by the catastrophic earthquakes of 1999 in Greece and 
Turkey. The earthquakes became the pretext for a complete reorientation of 
Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey. It was in this very context that George 
Papandreou spoke of the right to individual self-identification for members of 
the minority population in Greek Thrace, and thus initiated a debate over the 
possible modernization of Greece's minority policies22. In 2004, Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was allowed to visit Western Thrace, the first 
senior Turkish politician to visit the region since President Celal Bayar's visit in 
1952. For many Turkish journalists this visit marked the end of an era of mu-
tual suspicion and the success of the rapprochement23 
MIGRATION AND HARDSHIP: FROM ISTANBUL TO LAVRIO 
From the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne onwards successive Greek go-
vernments did not contribute to the economic development of the minority 
population in Western Thrace, following a policy that Alexis Alexandris - a di-
plomat himself- describes as one of "benign neglect"24. As a result, this region 
remained one of the most underdeveloped in Europe, and daily life became 
more and more difficult for some of its inhabitants. For them migration to 
Turkish, German or Greek urban centres emerged as an inevitable choice. 
20
 Athens News Agency, 13/03/90. 
21
 Tsakonas (Panayotis), Dokos (Thanos), « Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early 21st Century. A View 
from Athens », in Martin (Lenore), Keridis (Dimitris), eds., The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge : MIT Press, 2004. 
22
 Klik, August 1999 ; Flash Radio, 29/07/99. 
23
 See for ins tance « 52 yillik has re t bi t t i » (The end of 52 years of longing), Sabah, 09 /05 /04 . 
24
 Alexandris (Alexis), art.cit, p. 128. 
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Emigration to Turkey and Loss of Citizenship 
Emigration to Turkey was not a new phenomenon for the minority popu-
lation of Western Thrace. According to Tözün Bahçeli, there had been a conti-
nuous trend of emigration to Turkey. From 1939 to 1951 approximately 20 000 
people moved to Turkey, followed by a further 20 000 during the 1950s25. 
However, from the 1960s onwards the Turkish state did not provide Western 
Thracian immigrants with residence and work permits, thus making their 
settlement in Turkey very difficult26. The primary reason behind this policy 
was that the Turkish government wanted to maintain a large minority in the 
northern part of Greece that it could exploit for political benefit27. For the same 
reason the Turkish authorities tolerated or even supported certain extremist 
Turkish organizations in Turkey such as the Istanbul-based Solidarity 
Association of Turks of Western Thrace (Bati Trakya Türkleri Dayamşma 
Derneği), that called for the independence of Western Thrace. Both Turkish and 
Greek scholars have written extensively about this policy. Tözün Bahçeli, for 
instance, states : « The emigration of Muslim Turks from Greece to Turkey has 
continued to this day. The Turkish government does not encourage such emi-
gration, nor does it ordinarily grant citizenship to emigrants ; however it is fea-
red that this continued emigration would pave the way for the disappearance 
of the community in Greece »28. 
While Alexis Alexandris states : 
At the present moment both Greece and Turkey keep the potentially volatile issue 
of the minorities at abeyance. But given the Cyprus experience, the Greeks fear 
that the Turks, taking advantage of the existence of a large Turkish minority at 
Greece's northeastern panhandle, might be tempted to involve themselves in ano-
ther adventure on an even wider scale. These apprehensions are reinforced by 
Ankara's refusal, since 1960, to issue residence and work permits to Muslims with 
Hellenic nationality. The determination of the Turkish government to maintain a 
large minority in Greece coupled with the activities of the government-sponsored 
Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace, which advocates the 
"liberation of Western Thrace", added credibility to the Greek fears.29 
25
 Bahçeli (Tözün), Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, Boulder : Westview, 1990, p. 177. 
26
 Aarbakke (Vemund), op.cit., p. 32. 
27
 Although the Turkish authorities discourage immigration, they still provide special facilities for 
Thracian Muslim students wanting to pursue secondary and university education in Turkey. See Bahçeli 
(Tözün), op.cit., p. 178. According to Anastasia Karakasidou, as many as 8 000 minority children were stu-
dying in elementary schools, high schools and universities in Turkey in 1993. See Karakasidou 
(Anastasia), art.cit, p. 13. 
28
 Bahçeli (Tözün),« The Muslim-Turkish Community in Greece: Problems and Prospects », Journal of the 
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, 8 (1), 1987, p. 112. 
29
 Alexandris (Alexis), op.cit., p. 315. 
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As a result, many emigrants had to apply for the cancellation of their 
Greek citizenship in order to qualify for a Turkish one, since at that time there 
was no provision in Turkey for dual citizenship30. Others decided to return to 
Greece. Some of them, however, were now categorized as "stateless" persons31. 
This is due to the fact that members of the minority who had left Greece, even 
for a temporary period, had been denied re-entry under Article 19 of the Greek 
Citizenship Law enacted in 1955. This Article states that: 
A person of non-Greek e thnic origin leaving Greece wi thout the in tent ion of re-
tu rn ing may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. This also applies t o a 
person of non-Greek e thn ic origin bo r n a nd domiciled abroad. His minor chi ldren 
living abroad may be declared as hav ing lost Greek nat ional i ty if bo th parents or 
the surviving pa ren t have lost the same. The Minister of t he Interior decides in 
these ma t t e r s w i t h t he concurring opinion of the National Council.32 
I encountered such cases of "stateless" migrants - mainly Gypsies - while 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork in Gazi. These people had crossed the 
Greek borders illegally after the confiscation of their passports by the Greek 
authorities, and had eventually settled in the Greek capital. All of them were 
unemployed, without social insurance or healthcare benefits, and unable to 
communicate in the Greek language. 
Emigration to Athens and Social Exclusion 
After the collapse of the military dictatorship in the mid 1970s, Germany 
became a destination for many Western Thracian migrants33. At the same 
time, emigration to Athens and the neighbouring industrial areas was directly 
linked to the demand for cheap, unskilled labour34. The slow technological mo-
30
 Interview with the First Secretary of the Greek Embassy in London, Theodore Theodorou, London, 15 
November 2003 ; interview with the Consul General of Greece in Istanbul Alexis Alexandris, Istanbul, 18 
March 2004 ; interview with Mehmet in Istanbul, 10 March 2004; interview with Ömer in Istanbul, 13 
March 2004. 
31The late Alternate Foreign Minister Yiannos Kranidiotis estimated stateless persons at 500 on 27 
October 1998 (for more information, see Greek Helsinki Monitor, Minority Rights Group - Greece, 
Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, 18 September 1999, available at <http://www.ceehr.euv-frankfurt-o.de/hr/state.htm>). 
Nowadays less than one hundred of such former Greek citizens live in Greece as "stateless" persons. 
32
 The Greek government repealed this article of the Citizenship Law on 11 June 1998. The repeal, howe-
ver did not apply retroactively. 
33
 Geras imos Notaras c la ims t h a t western Thracian Mus l ims h ad not been al lowed t o migra te t o 
Germany dur ing t h e mi l i ta ry reg ime of 1967-1974 (see Notaras (Gerasimos),« I anomogene ia t ou plithis¬ 
mou . Ena chronio provl ima » (The Population's Lack of Homogenei ty . A Chronical Problem), in Academy 
of Athens , I anaptixi tis Thrakis (The Development of Thrace), Athens : Akadimia Athinon, p. 46 . 
3 4
 Petraki (Georgia), « I agora ergasias sto Lavrio ka ta t i n periodo 1956-87 » (Labour Market in Lavrio du-
r ing the Period 1956-1987), Enimerotiko deltio tou institoutou ergasias tis GSEE, 30-31, 1993, pp. 58-72 ; 
Petraki (Georgia), « Sti Xan th i ke sto Lavrio: Taxikes diastaseis tou meionot ikou stin Ellada », Sinchrona 
Themata, 65,1997, p. 85. 
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dernization of Greek industry and agriculture created a pressing demand for a 
flexible workforce. Those who decided to migrate to Athens in the 1970s and 
1980s belonged to the lower social and economic strata of Thrace's minority 
population. Large numbers of minority workers were employed in the indus-
trial areas of Lavrio, Markopoulo, Aspropirgo, and Eleysina35. Like many other 
migrants coming to Athens from other parts of Greece and from Egypt36, these 
workers did not have stable jobs. Their readiness to undertake short term or 
contract employment that often entailed dangerous or unhealthy working 
conditions helped characterize their minority identity37. 
Most of the migrants were recruited in Thrace by a French mining com-
pany (later named EMMEL) based in Lavrio, a suburb of Athens, in order to un-
dertake work that local workers usually refused38. EMMEL's then chief of per-
sonnel explained this practice in an interview to Georgia Petraki. It is 
interesting to note the different terms used by the interviewee to describe 
Western Thracian migrants. He refers to them as "Greeks of Turkish origin" (of-
ficial terminology), "Muslims" and "Mohammedans", using these terms inter-
changeably. In particular, the use of the term "Mohammedans" reminds us of 
the work of Edward Said, and indeed reveals a widespread belief that Islam is 
really « based upon an idea of apostolic succession culminating in 
Muhammad »39. 
We had no choice but to launch recruitment campaigns in Komotini [40]. The first 
Greeks of Turkish origin were brought to Lavrio by the French company in 1974-
1975. We had people working for us who had contacts with Muslims. They were 
trying to convince them to come and work, we also offered them a house. They 
had also tried to bring people from other regions too, but it was not possible. Thus 
they had no choice but to bring Mohammedans. There was only a shortage in 
smelters.41 
Many migrants also worked in the dynamite production sector of a nearby 
military plant (PYRKAL). After a series of fatal accidents, most of them resigned 
and sought work in a textile factory called Aigaio, also located in Lavrio. From 
1978 to 1986, Aigaio hired more than 600 workers from Western Thrace, who in 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 From the mid 1970s onwards factories located at Lavrio were also hiring immigrants from Egypt. See 
Petraki (Georgia), Apo to horafi sto ergostasio. I diamorfosi tou viomihanikou proletariatou sto sighrono 
Lavrio (From the Field to the Factory. The formation of an Industrial Proletariat in Modern Lavrio), 
Athens : Tipothito-Giorgos Dardanos, 2002, pp. 80-81. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Petraki (Georgia), « Sti Xanthi ke sto Lavrio » (art.cit.), p. 84. 
39
 See Said (Edward), Orientalism, London : Vintage, 2003, pp. 66, 280-281. 
40
 Komotini (Gümülcine in Turkish) is a town located in Western Thrace. 
41
 Petraki (Georgia), « I agora ergasias sto Lavrio » (art.cit.), p. 71. 
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most cases settled in Lavrio with their families. Even though it is not to be assu-
med that all of the workers were members of the minority population, Georgia 
Petraki does specify that the vast majority of them were “Greek Muslims”42. 
All of these migrants were working in low-ranking positions, for example 
as cleaners and transport workers. None of them was ever promoted to a more 
responsible post43. Apart from Lavrio, many migrants worked during the 1980s 
in factories and industries in other heavily industrialized suburbs of Athens, 
such as Aspropirgos, Drapetsona, Eleysina and Halkida. The limitation of their 
employment to that of hard physical jobs, in conjunction with squalid living 
conditions, differentiated these workers from the local Greek workers. 
Children of the minority families rarely attended classes at school. In most 
cases they had to look after their younger siblings or even to work in grocery 
stores and small factories that were still using child labour. In the early 1990s, 
Greek anti-racist organizations initiated a campaign for the creation of a 
Turkish school in Lavrio for the education of the migrants' children. This in-
itiative, however, was doomed to failure. Local authorities strongly opposed 
this idea and organized protests and public meetings. The most common ob-
jection to the establishment of a Turkish school in Lavrio was that such a de-
velopment would encourage minority migrant workers to settle permanently 
in the area, thus downgrading the quality of daily life44. 
In the late 1980s, economic crisis led to the closure of most of the factories 
in which Western Thracian migrants used to work. As a result, some returned 
to Western Thrace, some moved to other parts of Athens, while others decided 
to remain in Lavrio. Nowadays the last group numbers only a few families. 
However, this migration movement to Lavrio was a significant event in the 
history of Western Thracian migration to the greater metropolitan area. 
THE TURKISH NEIGHBOURHOOD IN GAZI: 
SPACE, MEMORY AND THE MUSLIM EVERYDAY 
From the outset of this research, I was particularly interested in the 
Muslim population of Gazi45, which nowadays is estimated at somewhere bet-
ween 3 000 and 4 000 people. Having read transcripts from several parlia-
mentary debates over the establishment of a central mosque in Athens, I had 
42
 Petiaki (Georgia), op.cit., pp . 80-81. 
4 3
 Pet iaki (Georgia), « Sti Xan th i ke sto Lavrio » (art.cit.), p. 85. 
4 4
 Ibid. 
4 5
 Gazi was n amed after a gas p l an t which wa s in operat ion un t i l t he mid 1980s. 
Dimitris Antoniou - Western Thracian Muslims in Athens \ 89 
learned that some MPs had suggested Gazi as an ideal place for its construc-
tion, because of its high Muslim concentration46. However, during these deba-
tes, the origins of these Muslims were never clarified. Were they immigrants 
from the Middle East or migrants from Western Thrace ? 
The visitor of Gazi cannot help noticing the peculiarities of the locality. 
Fashionable clubs and restaurants are located next to old refugee houses with 
enormous satellite dishes. In the daylight, one also notices many coffeehouses 
in which people are speaking Turkish, drinking tea instead of coffee, and wat-
ching Turkish television. In my effort to make sense of the local geography and 
to find answers to my questions, I asked Mehmet, a dear friend from Western 
Thrace, to put me in touch with a Muslim from Gazi. In a few days time, I was 
introduced to Kuru. 
Kuru is the so-called 'president' of the Muslims of Gazi and the founder of 
the Society of Thracians -Allilegii (“Solidarity”). He is considered to be one of 
the most educated members of that community, since he is a primary school 
graduate. He also seems to be among the few who have not adopted a second 
Christian name (like Antreas/Nazmin, Antonis/Hasan, Makis/Hüseyin, 
Savas/Mustafa, etc.), after settling in Athens47.I conducted with him some of 
the most fascinating interviews of my fieldwork research. In contrast to other 
Muslims of Gazi who were extremely suspicious about people interested in 
their community, Kuru spoke openly about the history of his migration to 
Athens and his religious life : 
I came to Athens in 1985, when I was 25. Before that I was living in Gümülcine 
[Komotini], where I grew up. At that time, I was facing serious economic problems. 
I had worked for many years with other Muslims as a sailor, but I was tired of it. 
Fortunately, in 1985 I was approached by people working for the social services, 
who told us that they could find a job for us in Athens, in the public sector. I had 
nothing to lose, so I came with my family. I was hired as a porter in a branch of the 
National Bank of Greece at Syntagma Square [48], where I continue to work to this 
46 The possibility of building a central mosque in Athens is unde r discussion since t h e 1970s. In 2000, a 
project for the construction of a large-scale central mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre in Peania, an area 
20 km east of t h e centre of Athens , has been adopted by t h e Greek government . Greek officials have only 
discussed this ma t te r wi th Arab diplomats, thus completely excluding local Musl ims. The Greek Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs - not the minis t ry for Education and Religious Affairs - has been drafting a s ta tu te in 
co-operation w i th the ambassadors of Morocco, lordan and the PLO representative. Meanwhi le King Fahd 
of Saudi Arabia has agreed to fund t he construction of both the mosque and the cultural centre. As expec-
ted, this governmenta l initiative was me t w i t h fierce opposition from MPs, clerics of the Orthodox Church 
and the local populat ion. Typical a rgumen t s against the construction of the mosque are t ha t it will en-
courage large numbers of Musl ims to settle in the area, or that t h e central mosque will be visible from the 
airplanes approaching Athens in ternat ional airport. See Antoniou (Dimitris), « Musl im Immigran t s in 
Greece : Religious Organization and Local Responses », Immigrants and Minorities, 22 (2-3), 2004. 
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day. I was clever. Others from Gümülcine who were also offered jobs decided not 
to come to Athens. They were too afraid that they would have to wear a cross, that 
they would become Christians. 
I was not afraid of that. I knew from the very beginning that this would not hap-
pen. I was telling them, « Aren't we Greek citizens ? why should we be afraid ? » 
When I went back to Gümülcine the next summer, all these people found out not 
only that I was still a Muslim, but also that I had a good job and that I had bought 
an apartment with an interest-free loan from the government. 
Of course I was not the only one offered a job in the public sector. Many of my 
friends have also found jobs in banks, hospitals, etc. When people in Gümülcine 
found out that we have a good life here, they decided to move to Athens too. But 
they could not find jobs. So they moved to these old houses. They were stupid... 
They did not say "yes" from the very beginning. Now they complain. They say to 
me,« You have a job, a big apartment, you are rich ». And I reply,« You morons. The 
state f...ed [49] once and it is not going to be f...ing forever ». 
Kuru Hüseyin's words were indeed revealing as regards a state policy that 
was encouraging metadimotefsi, the resettlement of members of the minority 
population in other parts of Greece, a policy that started in the early 1980s. Part 
of this policy was to offer to members of the minority population employment 
in the public sector and to provide them with interest-free loans. According to 
some Greek journalists the only condition was that the migrants transfer their 
voting rights from Western Thrace to Athens. The objective behind this policy 
thus becomes obvious : to weaken minority political participation in the area 
of Western Thrace50. However, Yiannis Kapsis, Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs from 1982 to 1988, described the policy of metadimotefsi during an 
interview in a different way: 
This policy was my idea. My goal was to encourage the integration of Western 
Thracian Muslims into Greek society. The situation in Western Thrace was quite 
problematic not because of the discriminatory measures against the Muslims -
which Antreas Papandreou had already agreed with me to ban - but mainly due 
to the local mafias that were established over the years. These local mafias, consis-
ting of both Christians and Muslims, were making enormous amounts of money 
through the continuation of some discriminatory measures against Muslims [51]. 
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The only thing we could offer to people willing to settle in different parts of 
Greece was a job. Nothing else. We never asked them to transfer their voting 
rights. Take for example the existing community in Drapetsona. To this day most 
of them vote in Komotini.52 
Through these interviews, I discovered that the Gazi community consists 
of two different groups. In addition, I was able to explain why some of the mi-
grants in Gazi and the neighbouring areas of Votanikos and Keramikos are in 
a far better economic situation than others. These are the individuals who did 
not hesitate to accept the afore-mentioned offers made to them by the state. In 
contrast to what Kuru claims, in my research I found that most of the migrants 
who live in the old refugee houses are those who moved to Athens before 1982, 
when Yiannis Kapsis became Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. In my exa-
mination of this second group of migrants I was surprised to discover that, in 
most cases, the families were in fact renting the old refugee houses which see-
med in such poor condition. A family typically rents one or two rooms, and 
shares a courtyard, bathroom, and kitchen facilities with another family53. 
This housing arrangement and practice clearly reflect the poor economic si-
tuation and unemployment characterizing this particular group of Western 
Thracian migrants. 
More specifically the main types of employment that they can find are 
jobs as street vendors, second-hand dealers, scrap merchants and builders. 
According to various studies more than two-thirds of the women are unem-
ployed, while men work, on average, less than 15 days per month54. Many of 
them have no social insurance or healthcare benefits. Recent educational in-
itiatives, such as the establishment of an intercultural school in the district of 
Votanikos and the organization of afternoon literacy classes by volunteers and 
non-governmental organizations, have pledged to improve the life of the 
Muslim residents in this area55. Despite these pledges, considerable time must 
pass before decent living conditions can be established. A report issued by the 
Greek Ministry of Health regarding the Muslim migrants living in Gazi states : 
Some of these migrants, who do not know how to read or communicate in the 
Greek language, are inevitably enclosed within Gazi boundaries, incapable of 
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working outside.... Cases of social exclusion are constantly multiplying. This is a 
result of unemployment, poverty and despair.... Cases of alcoholism and drug use, 
especially among the youth, are constantly rising. Thus a general rise in crimina-
lity is inevitable.... The identification of Greek Muslims with foreigners by those 
possessing feelings of religious fanaticism results in racism and xenophobia.56 
This report, however, does not elaborate further on the agents of “racism and 
xenophobia”. Who is afraid of the xenos, the “foreigner” ? Is it only the Greeks of 
Gazi and Votanikos ? The majority of the Muslim migrants living in Gazi are 
Turkish-speakers ; for them, speaking Turkish offers a higher social status and 
constitutes a proof of their Turkish identity. Most of them, however, speak a mix 
of Turkish and Romany and manifest from time to time a Turkish-Gypsy identity. 
All of them are discriminated against and labelled "Gypsies" by other Western 
Thracian migrants in Athens. Similarly, Turkish-speaking Muslim Gypsies living 
in Gazi are considered Gypsies and not Turks by most members of the minority 
population in Western Thrace, as noted by Olga Demetriou : « By the time I ac-
tually arrived in Komotini, I had met with Gümülcinelis [Turkish-speaking inha-
bitants of Komotini/Gümülcine] who had migrated to London and Turkey and 
had been informed that the migrants in Athens are Gypsies and not Turks »57. 
The Muslim population of Gazi has attracted the attention not only of the 
Greek Ministry of Health but also of the Turkish press. Thus, an extended arti-
cle on the religious life of the Muslims of Gazi appeared in Zaman, a Turkish 
daily newspaper. The article incorporates interviews with local Muslims on 
the problems they are facing in their daily practice of Islam, as well as their re-
ligious dependence on Western Thrace and Turkey : 
Because there is no imam to perform the funeral rituals, our deceased have been 
travelling an 800 km distance to Gümülcine [Komotini] or to iskeçe [Xanthi] for 
year... There is no one who would teach our religion to our children. I know two sure 
[58], that is all I grew up with, my children perhaps know one. But their children 
neither know Turkish nor their religion. We bought books from Turkey with our 
own money and we made photocopies, but it is not enough... Nowadays we only 
listen to the Glorious Qur'an from cassettes, because we do not know how to read 
it. We also chant the mevlid [59] from cassettes which we bring from Turkey.60 
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The appearance of this article in the Turkish press urged me to inquire 
into the religious life of that particular locality of Athens. Having known that 
some Western Thracian Muslims in other parts of the capital had established 
their own mescits (prayer halls), I was interested in discovering the Muslim 
everyday in Gazi. My findings were indeed surprising. The Gazi community 
lacks a place of worship. This was explained to me on economic grounds by 
one of my informants, who claimed that the cost of maintaining a mescit is 
very high61. When I asked his reasons for not attending mescits supported by a 
Western Thracian organization called Filotita, I received a surprising answer : 
« They are Pomaks, they are of a different race. They hang around with the 
Arabs. We don't » 62. 
THE COFFEE HOUSE IN PLATEIA VATHIS: 
SYMBOLIC AND SOCIAL WORLDS 
These initial contacts with the Western Thracian Muslims of Gazi genera-
ted a series of questions regarding the identity, history of migration to Athens, 
and religious organization of the people often described as Pomaks. However, 
what had become clear was that the Gazi community maintained very limited 
contacts with the other Western Thracian Muslims of the capital, and had 
created their own imagery to describe the Pomaks of Athens. The Pomaks were 
considered to be of a "different race", capable of "hanging out with the Arabs", 
and in a better state both economically and religiously. All of them were sup-
posedly living in Plateia Vathis, only one and a half kilometres away from Gazi. 
Many years ago, Sotiria Bellou, a famous rebetiko singer, sang a song en-
titled Plateia Vathis (Vathis Square). The song was named after a downgraded 
area in central Athens and related the hard life of the workers living there. It 
also addressed the socio-economic inequalities characterizing life in Athens. 
Plateia Vathis, even though quite central, has never constituted a destination 
for wealthy Athenians, mainly due to its reputation as an area with a high 
concentration of brothels and criminals. It is for this reason that, in another 
verse of the song, the composer invites his friend to visit Plateia Vathis in order 
to « witness the kind of life he lives » (ela na mathis stin Plateia Vathis ti zoi 
perno), the life of the poor. In this sense, little has changed over the last few 
years in Plateia Vathis, as it continues to attract the new poor of the capital: 
migrants from Albania, the former Soviet Union, South Asia and Western 
61
 Interview with Mehmet in Gazi, 15 July 2004. 
62
 Ibid. 
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Thrace. This last group of migrants is the one Muslims in Gazi had been refer-
ring to : the Pomaks. 
Pomak social life in Plateia Vathis is organized around coffee houses and 
restaurants, most of them named after villages in Rhodope. It is in these places 
that one gets a strong sense of Pomak public life. My first encounters with this 
community took place in a coffee house/restaurant called Kentavros. The esta-
blishment of Kentavros follows the pattern of the old kafeneia, coffeehouses 
divided along lines of origin, named after villages or regions outside Athens, 
and which used to serve as a meeting place for the sintopites. These were 
Greeks originating from the same village, who had migrated to the capital and 
who were still trying to integrate into the tough urban life of the 1950s and 
1960s. In this respect Kentavros is one of the last region-based kafeneia of 
Athens, even though it was established quite recently, in the mid 1980s. 
Kentavros is a place solely frequented by men who came to Athens during 
the last twenty years. For them, emigration to neighbouring Turkey did not 
seem to be a viable option, as the country was facing severe economic pro-
blems, and they had been informed by their networks in Istanbul that there 
were few jobs available. Such migration is in most cases a seasonal and male 
experience. Women are usually left behind in the villages to take care of the 
children, the elderly, the animals, fields and houses. However, there are some 
cases of whole families migrating to urban centres. According to Domna 
Michail, those who migrate with their families are usually « long term mi-
grants who have stopped any kind of productive activity in the villages and if 
some day they come back to their village permanently they choose other oc-
cupations than that of cultivating tobacco »63. 
These people seem to comprise the vast majority of Western Thracian mi-
grants. In Athens they also reside in another downgraded area, Akadimia 
Platonos, because of the availability of cheap housing. Some of them also re-
side in the suburbs of Nea Makri, and Eleysina, where they usually work as 
builders, agricultural labourers or unskilled manual workers in small factories 
and shipyards. Through my contacts with the people of Kentavros I discovered 
that a large number of Pomaks work in the shipyards of Perama, when work is 
available. Otherwise, they visit friends and family in Holland and Germany 
who also happen to work in shipyards. Through these networks they are able 
to find part-time employment in the same line of work as they pursue when 
in Greece. 
In the Pomak coffee houses of Plateia Vathis, many stories are told about 
how difficult work in the shipyards can be and how inevitable it is that young 
men should seek employment far from their birthplace. All these narratives re-
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veal a great deal of nostalgia for the Pomak villages of Rhodope, as well as a 
fear for the consequences that a prolonged stay in the capital might have. Life 
in these mountainous villages is always portrayed as better. The food tastes 
better, women look better, the regions' climate makes people healthier. In 
contrast, life in Athens is mostly viewed as a mere necessity, accompanied by 
daily challenges. As one of my informants put it, the greatest challenge of all 
« is not to forget who you are, what your language and religion are ». In this 
context my informant expressed a concern very similar to the one expressed 
by the Gazi resident to Zaman's reporter. 
Undoubtedly, the coffee houses constitute a safe environment, where peo-
ple feel able to manifest a different linguistic and religious identity. One of the 
first things I noticed during my fieldwork research was that in the coffeehou-
ses people were not hesitating to address each other with their real Muslim 
names. This is certainly not the practice in the outside world where Pomak mi-
grants feel obliged to adopt a second Christian name. Daily communication 
can take place not only in Greek but also in the Pomak dialect, as well as in 
Turkish. It is in this environment again that people can openly discuss their 
plans to return to their villages for the celebration of major Muslim festivals. 
However, linguistic preferences do not necessarily reveal an ethnic allegiance, 
nor does the celebration of Ramadan reveal a great degree of devotion. To this 
day I find it very difficult to talk about a single Pomak identity and to define 
Pomakness at a macro level. Over the years I came across many individuals 
who manifest a Pomak identity and have totally different understandings of 
its content. Against this background, I will now shift my focus of interest from 
coffeehouses to individuals and discuss the case of Mehmet imam and the ac-
tivities of a Muslim organization called Filotita. 
MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN ATHENS: THE CASE OF FILOTITA 
Identifying the existing Western Thracian Muslim organizations in the 
Greek capital and determining their number and size is an immensely difficult 
task, since most of them are not officially registered and sometimes operate 
for a short period of time. Even though I have studied only the case of two 
Western Thracian Muslim organizations, some of my informants have also 
mentioned the existence of several others, less vocal and active64. These func-
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tion along with many other ethnic-based organizations established by Muslim 
immigrants65. In most cases, both their members and their governing boards 
are of poor educational background and have a very limited knowledge of 
Greek. 
In this respect, the Pan-Hellenic Federation in Support of the Muslims in 
Greece - Filotita (Friendship) - is an exception to the rule. This federation was 
established by Pomak university graduates in 1997 and constitutes an impor-
tant development in the history of Muslim presence in the capital in general 
and Western Thracian migration to Athens in particular. This initiative reflects 
not only the manner in which some members of the Pomak community consi-
der their residence in Athens as a permanent settlement, but also a shift in 
their perceptions of the capital. For them, Athens no longer represents the dis-
tant capital of a repressive state, but a leading migratory destination which at-
tracts thousands of Muslims from different parts of the world. What is also 
interesting to note concerning Filotita's founding members is that they articu-
late an identity discourse that differs from the one of the Turkish minority 
elite in Western Thrace, and distance themselves both from the official Greek 
and Turkish rhetoric regarding the Muslim minority. These Pomaks may well 
be the Athenian equivalent of the new Pomak elite described by Olga 
Demetriou in Komotini66. 
« Our Muslim Brothers !» : Filotita's Manifesto 
Filotita's somewhat confused ideology is reflected in its manifesto, which 
was written in Turkish by its president Mehmet imam, and was circulated 
both in villages in Rhodope and in Athens. 
Our Muslim Brothers ! 
As is known to all of you, for long years the minorities living in Greece have been 
deprived of their social, cultural and religious rights. 
For that reason, and as we constitute the minorities living in this country, it was 
decided on 7 November 1997 to establish an association in order to win our rights 
and to give life to the philosophy of the principle of equality which exists in mo-
dern democracies and countries, and the decision was approved by the authorized 
court and gained official status on 24 November 1997. 
Our aim is to achieve the unity of individual minority members, regardless of eth-
nic origin, and to provide social benefits. 
Our Association's name is Filotita. Its main principles are social and humanist 
[ones]. Our aim is to take human love and brotherhood as our base, to obtain the sup-
port even of non-Muslims, and to take our place in line with contemporary Europe. 
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Obtaining our religious, linguistic, cultural and social rights in an uninterrupted 
manner and in the way provided by humane principles and international law, and 
bringing them down into everyday life, liberates us from pressure[67]. Filotita 
aims at doing a small contribution to participation, human values, brotherhood, 
impartiality, love of nature and a tomorrow free of anxiety. Our purpose is to en-
compass all people facing problems in Greece. [Filotita] claims to struggle in order 
to achieve our rights in a democratic way, to prove our existence and to fulfil the 
religious requirements in the way our exalted God demands. In this [endeavour] 
we have and will have the biggest support from you. Your existence and your sup-
port will be our greatest strength. 
If there had been an institution which would meet our demands, the existence of 
such an organization would not even have been considered. Because historical 
conditions and documents show that those regions in which minorities reside 
have been intentionally left underdeveloped, non-integrated and alienated from 
their cultural structure. We think that our ethnic identity is a decisive reason for 
this. The areas whose cultural structure and level of education is the lowest in 
Greece are those where the minorities reside. Filotita wants to break the narrow 
circle and to play an active role in beautiful perspectives in which all of us will live 
together, to integrate people without discrimination, to abolish fragmentation 
and, on the basis of humanistic principles, to bring together people from all reli-
gious beliefs. 
To achieve our unity and to make our presence felt as a single voice is a right 
which is granted to us under the laws and by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and we have to use these to the very end. 
As a result of the needs of minorities, Filotita has emerged from amidst these mi-
norities. It defends human love, togetherness, and the virtues of living together. 
For many years minorities in Greece have been neglected and received second 
class treatment. Minorities throughout Greece should from now on defend their 
cause and understand the character of their own structure. 
The basic rule of living humanly is to defend your right. The provision of having 
your own religion is to worship freely. 
Our Muslim brothers, we want to see you in our unity and togetherness.68 
The manifesto was clearly written by a non-native Turkish speaker. The 
sentences are long and complicated; they are difficult to follow, to understand 
and to translate. For poorly educated readers, Filotita's manifesto is impressive. 
The usage of words like "minorities", "rights", "democracy" and "law" is exten-
sive. It aims to capture the attention of an audience which for many years was 
discriminated against by the Greek state, and also to describe the beginning of 
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a new era marked by the establishment of Filotita. At the same time, compli-
cated sentences underline the authority of the author. 
As he mentioned in an interview with me, Mehmet imam is « a native 
speaker of the Pomak language » while he learned Turkish at school69. He 
claims to have been among the first from the village of Ehinos/Şahin to break 
the “narrow circle” (dar çember) he refers to in the above manifesto, by finishing 
high school in Istanbul and pursuing university education at Istanbul 
University. After an unsuccessful attempt to become a local MP on a PASOK tic-
ket in Western Thrace, he settled in Athens, where he established Filotita. 
Mehmet imam, like many other Pomaks of Athens also distances himself from 
the official rhetoric of both Greece and Turkey regarding the minority popula-
tion of Western Thrace. He defines himself as “Pomak”, “Rhodopean”, 
“European” and “Greek citizen”, but never as “Greek” or “Turk”. 
Filotita as an Intermediary between Western Thracian Muslims, 
Muslim Migrants and the Greek Society ? 
To what extent the ideals expressed in the manifesto correspond to 
Filotita's activities in Athens ? For Mehmet imam, one of the major problems 
characterizing the minority population of Western Thrace was a lack of proper 
representation (« If there had been an institution which would meet our de-
mands, the existence of such an organization would not even have been consi-
dered »). According to him, Filotita's members soon realized that the only way 
to gain lobbying power with the Greek government was to try to represent all 
Muslims living in Greece. It is perhaps for this reason that he refers to "mino-
rities" in plural and addresses his "Muslim Brothers", thus stressing a common 
religious identity. In this respect, Filotita has been quite successful since the 
majority of its members consists of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Egyptian, 
Sudanese, Algerian, Albanian, Philippine and Burmese immigrants rather 
than Western Thracian Muslims. Most of the latter immigrated to Greece in 
the 1990s, and reside in underdeveloped neighbourhoods of the capital where 
also most of the Western Thracian migrants reside70. Religion is not the only 
link between the two groups, who share common social characteristics and 
face similar problems. Muslims in Athens are usually males, aged between 25 
and 44, unskilled and underpaid manual workers with limited knowledge of 
the Greek language71. Their settlement in Athens has led to conditions already 
experienced in other European capitals : weak individual rights, social exclu-
sion and the emergence of racist reactions from the local majority population. 
69
 Interview with Mehmet imam, 2 October 2003. 
70
 Antoniou (Dimitris), art.cit. 
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 Ibid. 
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As one could read in the manifesto, Filotita expresses a will to assist not 
only members of the minority population of Western Thrace, but also to « en-
compass all people facing problems in Greece ». Its projects have focused on the 
creation of a religious infrastructure for the capital's Muslims, by organizing 
Qur'an courses for Muslim children, lobbying for the establishment of a Muslim 
cemetery and supporting the establishment of several “multi ethnic” mescits in 
the city centre72. Such places of worship are also frequented by Pomaks, who -
like the Muslim residents of Gazi - lack a mescit of their own. According to 
Mehmet imam Filotita has also created and implemented local development 
programmes for the teaching of the Greek language to the Muslims of the ca-
pital and has played an active role in assisting Muslim illegal immigrants to le-
galize their presence in Greece, by providing them with free legal advice. 
Through the regular appearances of some of its members in TV shows, it has 
tried to promote a national dialogue aimed at counteracting “Islamophobia”. In 
this context it is particularly important to note Mehmet imam's active involve-
ment in the debate over the establishment of a central mosque in Athens, 
which operated across local, national and international levels73. 
Despite its efforts, Filotita receives no assistance from state bodies and or-
ganizations. Some limited assistance is received from Greek leftists, who can 
be viewed as the "non-Muslims" described in the manifesto. The latter play an 
important role in processes of negotiation and intercultural communication 
between Filotita's members on the one hand, and the Greek government and 
society on the other. This is particularly the case with a university lecturer at a 
university in Athens. For this member the reason behind volunteering for such 
an organization is not conversion to Islam but a strong determination to fight 
against the state's minority policies and the social exclusion faced by the mi-
grants. It seems that for that member, Filotita represents the ultimate enemy 
of a nationalistic state, church and society: a Muslim organization established 
in Athens by individuals of undefined ethnic origin. 
72
 Since there are no Muslim cemeteries in Athens, Western Thracian Muslims are forced to transport 
their deceased back to Thrace. This fact has resulted into a serious economic burden, which is usually im-
possible for family members to meet. In this situation the entire community must raise funds in order to 
cover the expense of this transfer. Nevertheless Theodore Theodorou of the Greek Embassy in London 
claimed that the müftülüks (the Mufti Offices) of Western Thrace usually undertake the financial cost of 
such transportation. Interview with Theodore Theodorou, London, 15 November 2003. 
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 Mehmet İmam used this opportunity to express his own concerns in regard to the building of the cen-
tral mosque. He considered that a central mosque far away from the city center cannot serve the devo-
tional needs of the capital's Muslim population. To his mind Athenian Muslims are fully capable of rai-
sing funds and establishing their own mosques as long as the Greek state and the Orthodox Church allow 
them to do so. See Foreign Correspondent, Being Greek, ABC, broadcasted on the 13th July 2004. 
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CONCLUSION : FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL 
The settlement of Western Thracian Muslims in Athens provides a useful 
long-term case study of internal migration. Despite the long history of this mi-
gration and its significance, it has not attracted the attention of many scholars. 
This is perhaps a result of the interaction between academic and official dis-
courses on Greek national space, which portray only one region as impure : 
that of Western Thrace. Such regions are always considered most interesting 
for scholars, who themselves by no means constitute a homogenous group. In 
the case of Western Thrace, some authors - let us call them international rela-
tions experts and historians - strive to prove how mistaken the Turkish state 
is in accusing Greece of human rights violations in the area and to provide evi-
dence of the Greekness of the Pomaks. Others - let us call them anthropolo-
gists - are extremely critical, and rightly so, of Greek state policies, and attempt 
to challenge mainstream ethnic categorizations such as “Pomaks”, “Turks”, 
“ethnic Turks”, “Athingani” and “Gypsies”. In these analyses, however, the rea-
sons for the problematic situation in Western Thrace and the subsequent mi-
gration movements to Athens are only traced to Greco-Turkish minority poli-
cies, thus overlooking the role of individual agency. In this respect, Yiannis 
Kapsis' interview is particularly useful, since it underlines a factor which is 
often forgotten, that of local economic interests. In other words, it is not only 
Greece and Turkey that have manipulated the minority population of Western 
Thrace for their own ends, but also locals, both Christian and Muslim, profiting 
from these states' mutual antagonism. 
Having said this, I would agree with the vast majority of scholars that the 
minority population of Western Thrace is far from being homogenous. The mi-
grants discussed in this article constitute diverse and fragmented communities, 
who, in many cases, reproduce problems and attitudes originating from their si-
tuation in Western Thrace. In examining aspects of their presence in Athens, I 
have observed perceptions and manifestations of multiple and situational iden-
tities, resulting to some extent from conflicting Greek and Turkish state poli-
cies. Within this context, one can understand why scholars conducting research 
in Thrace are informed that some migrants living in Athens are "Gypsies" and 
not "Turks". It is again this context that explains why one of my interlocutors 
from Gazi describes Filotita's members as from a “different race”, and why 
Mehmet İmam identifies himself as “Pomak” but never as either “Greek” or 
“Turk”. 
To argue exclusively, however, that the Western Thracian migrants of 
Athens are divided along lines of language, culture and origin is surely not a 
particularly novel insight. I find it more sensible to investigate the new dyna-
mics created by the migrants' settlement in Athens, and to ask: what changes 
when Western Thracian Muslims settle in the metropolis ? 
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For many years, the Muslim residents of Western Thrace were directly in-
fluenced by the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne on the one hand, and by 
the Greco-Turkish conflict on the other. Having moved to Athens, however, 
they are now in a different position. Their settlement in the metropolis signi-
fied an almost automatic loss of interest in them on behalf of both states as 
well as a loss of educational provisions. The migrants are viewed neither as 
"fifth columnists" nor as potential allies. Over the years, they have attempted 
to adjust to conditions in their respective localities, dealing with illiteracy, 
acute hardship, economic marginality, political neglect and nostalgia for the 
places they had left. The use of both Christian and Muslim names, the enor-
mous satellite dishes in Gazi and the establishment of coffeehouses all repre-
sent the migrants' efforts not only to integrate into the life of the metropolis, 
but also to distance themselves from it, maintaining links with their home-
land, its languages and traditions. Furthermore, this reveals a preference for 
re-establishing familiar patterns and overcoming the personal alienation and 
social disintegration into which many other migrants and refugees have sunk. 
Thus the migrants' arrival in a city, which for the last fifteen years has of-
fered shelter to thousands of other Muslim immigrants, has posed many new 
challenges. This in turn has undoubtedly created new dynamics among them. 
Allilegii and Filotita, for instance, constitute entities that developed indepen-
dently of similar organizations in Western Thrace. They are organized around 
different leaders and address different needs. In this paper I have focused 
more on the case of Filotita, not only because it is the most active and vocal 
Muslim organization of the capital, but also because its function signifies a 
transition from the "local" to the "global". What I refer to as "local" is the Greco-
Turkish conflict and its legacy of painful memories. The "global" on the other 
hand is associated with challenges such as illegal migration and the new 
Muslim presence in the “West”. Filotita's determination to represent all its 
"Muslim Brothers" regardless of ethnic background and to participate in the 
debate over the establishment of a Central Mosque has, in a way, helped it to 
overcome the regional boundaries so clearly symbolized by the coffee houses 
in Plateia Vathis. It is undoubtedly the Muslim organizations' positioning in 
this latter context that will determine their significance in years to come. 
